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The India That Does 
Not Shine
India’s Muslim community rarely re-
ceives much attention in the media, 
either in its own country or in the larg-
er world. When it does, the context is 
invariably that of victimization at the 
hands of aggressive Hindu national-
ism—Gujarat in 2002, Mumbai (Bom-
bay) in 1992–3—or, more frequently, 
as a threat to India’s internal stabil-
ity and security. The bombings of the 
“Friendship Express” that runs between 
Delhi and Lahore on 19 February, and 
the even more horrific serial blasts on Mumbai suburban trains on 
11 July 2006, are recent examples of events that have solidified anti-
Muslim sentiments in India. Officials normally accuse specific extrem-
ist organizations based in Kashmir, or the secret Pakistani intelligence 
services ISI, of being behind these acts, but among ordinary people in 
India Muslims are widely seen as “anti-national,” clannish, and hostile to 
India as a nation. These attitudes have deep historical roots in the nine-
teenth century and in the conflicts that led to the Partition of India and 
Pakistan in 1947. They have also been systematically cultivated by the 
Hindu nationalist movement in India to the point that such attitudes, 
today, constitute a sort of common sense among large sections of the 
population. While suspicions and apprehensions regarding Muslims 
have long existed among India’s Hindu communities, blaming all of 
India’s problems on its minorities—as has become standard and unob-
trusive practice in both public and private arenas—was never common 
until recently. After 9/11, by way of contrast, the term “terrorist” has 
been seamlessly imported into the already vicious anti-Muslim rhetoric 
currently circulating in India.
For scholars and activists working with Muslims in India, it has long 
been known that the 140 million Muslims in the country—immensely 
diverse in terms of language, religious orientation, and social class—
were among India’s poorest and most marginalized citizens. It was also 
well known that decades of anti-Muslim rhetoric, everyday discrimina-
tion, and neglect by the government had brought about a situation 
of cultural introversion, economic marginality, and a huge deficit in 
education and social advancement compared to most other citizens 
of the country. 
The Sachar report
Now, with the publication of the so-called Sachar report (named 
after the chairman of the specially-appointed “Prime Minister’s High 
Level Committee,” Justice Rajender Sachar) all of this has become offi-
cial knowledge.1 The report was ordered by Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh in order to shed comprehensive light on the living conditions 
and general situation of the Muslim community in India. The political 
motivations were clear: a large and disaffected Muslim minority—the 
biggest minority in the world—constitutes a significant security chal-
lenge but also a significant pool of votes which the Congress party 
used to be able to bank on but has lost since the 1980s. However, there 
are more than political tactics involved here. The rapid transformation 
of India’s economy demands new forms of intensive governance, bet-
ter infra structure, and a more efficient utilization of the enormous re-
serves of skills and manpower in the country. Muslims are generally not 
part of the ongoing economic boom or even its derived effects, such 
as the service- and security-related industries, which recruit very few 
Muslims. Political and social life in India has always been deeply seg-
mented, but now the new economic boom threatens to disentangle 
India’s Muslims from its mainstream economy. The report states quite 
clearly that it was motivated by a need to collect and systematize exist-
ing knowledge about the Muslims in India in order for the government 
to be able to calibrate future initiatives 
to (re-)incorporate Muslims into Indian 
society, and in order to qualify a debate 
on minorities that “largely revolved 
around perceptions and rhetoric.”2
The work of the Sachar committee is 
both remarkable and deeply disturb-
ing in its documentation of decades 
of systematic neglect, non-action, and 
open exclusion of Muslims from virtu-
ally every facet of life in the country. In 
the preface to the report, the commit-
tee admits difficulties in collecting data and corroborated knowledge, 
but also states that its methodology included a large number of visits 
to different states in India and meetings with many local leaders, busi-
ness people, intellectuals, and social activists in these states. This proc-
ess of consultation received an overwhelming response from Muslims 
across the country. It is indeed remarkable that the first chapter of the 
report is entirely devoted to a compilation of the views and percep-
tions recorded in these meetings. The report does not judge the valid-
ity or veracity of these perceptions, but argues very sensibly that they 
“are not built in a vacuum,” and that such perceptions form an essential 
part of the reality that the government has to deal with.
Laying demographic anxieties to rest
In a country that has been saturated by longstanding right-wing 
stereotypes of Muslims as a “pampered minority” that is against birth 
control and wants to dominate Indian society, the chapter in the report 
on demographic trends is indeed sobering reading. While it is true that 
overall fertility among Muslims is slightly above average compared 
to other groups in Indian society, it has been declining over the past 
decade. It also varies enormously within India and, in many states, 
the birth rate among Muslims is lower than among Hindus. There is a 
well-established correlation between fertility and the education level 
of women. As such, the generally low level of education among Mus-
lims, and especially Muslim women, goes a long way toward explaining 
the birth rate differences. Other factors are that Muslims generally live 
longer than Hindus, and that the survival rate among Muslim children 
is significantly higher than among other communities at similar socio-
economic levels. Muslims are less frequent users of contraception and 
the report reiterates what researchers and activists have known for a 
long time: there exists a longstanding suspicion of government clin-
ics among Muslims, and there are relatively fewer of these clinics in 
Muslim localities. The lack of female doctors is one reason for this lack 
of trust. Another is the perception that the government wants to steri-
lize Muslims. This notion originated in the forced sterilization drives 
during the state of emergency in 1975–77 where mostly poor people, 
among them many Muslims, were targeted. Subsequent “demographic 
anxieties” propagated by right-wing Hindu nationalists keep such fears 
alive. The report states very clearly that even at the present birth rate, 
Muslims would at the most constitute 19 percent of the population in 
2050.
Education and living conditions
The most damning evidence of governmental neglect and discrimi-
nation at all levels of Indian society is presented in the chapters on edu-
cation and economic standing. Muslims have fallen behind on every 
educational parameter since Independence in spite of being more ur-
banized than most communities: literacy levels are far below the aver-
age level and are not improving, the school dropout rate is the highest 
among all groups, and the average years of school attendance among 
Muslims is the lowest in the country. There is evidence of systematic 
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under-investment in government schools and education in 
areas with large numbers of Muslims, and the discrimina-
tion, or lack of encouragement, of those in the educational 
system is evident. The relative number of young people who 
graduate is falling as compared to every other group, and 
the higher one goes in the system of higher education the 
fewer Muslims one is likely to find. Among graduate stu-
dents at India’s leading colleges, only one in fifty is a Mus-
lim—a figure much lower than any other group, including 
the former untouchable communities.
One of the reasons commonly given for the high drop-
out rates and lack of higher education among Muslims is 
that there is little incentive because a very small number of 
Muslims ever manage to get a job in the public sector, the 
bureaucracy, or the large and rapidly expanding formal sec-
tor of the economy, which includes service, technology and 
industry. The report does indeed confirm that the majority 
of Muslims are either self employed or employed in small 
and informal businesses and enterprises. Many of these are 
in the traditional artisan occupations of Muslims (weaving, 
carpentry, metal work, mechanics, etc.) and in petty trade. 
These businesses are small, low-investment and as a whole 
outside, if not wholly excluded from, the new economy in 
India. The chapter on bank and credit in the report bears 
this out and shows that Muslims are less involved in bor-
rowing and streams of credit than any other community in the coun-
try. My own experience from working in Muslim areas in Mumbai and 
Aurangabad confirms that a majority of employees work for Muslim-
owned businesses, borrow through informal credit systems, and that 
the many Muslims no longer even consider applying for jobs in Hindu 
owned companies. Those owned by other minority groups—Christian, 
Parsi, Sikh, and so on—are generally seen as more open to Muslim em-
ployees. This overall “economic introversion” in the Muslim community 
creates low expectations of formal employment among younger gen-
erations, which in turn adds to the already low level of visibility of Mus-
lims in the public sector. Except for a few states, where Muslims make 
up around a quarter of the population and where there is a consistent 
tradition of left-leaning secularism (West Bengal and Kerala), one rarely 
finds employment rates of Muslims in the public sector exceeding ten 
percent. In most other regions, the figure is below five percent, and 
there Muslims tend to be occupied in lower positions such as clerks, 
peons, or in menial maintenance jobs. The higher the prestige and vis-
ibility of a sector (foreign service, top cadres like the Indian Adminis-
trative Service (IAS), police services, banks, and the armed forces) the 
lower the percentage of Muslims; indeed, it is not uncommon for them 
to constitute less than two percent of the workforce.
The feeling of being outside the state and the mainstream economy 
means that very few young Muslims appear in the qualifying exams for 
the civil service and even fewer actually apply for government jobs. A 
longstanding friend of mine, Asif Ali Khan, is involved in an organiza-
tion in Mumbai that assists young Muslims in qualifying and applying 
for government jobs—from the railways to the municipality, among 
others. A few weeks ago, he told me: “we have sent thousands of appli-
cations on behalf of qualified boys in the past few years and all we have 
got out of it is jobs for a few handfuls of them. We have more success 
with private companies, not least security companies that now recruit 
large numbers of guards and watchmen in the city. We have submitted 
this evidence of discrimination to the government but [there’s been] 
no reaction so far. Maybe with the Sachar report they will be forced to 
take some action, at least.”
Diverse Muslim communities
The report lists many more features of the current predicament of 
marginality and isolation of Muslims in India. Throughout, Muslims are 
treated as a single community spelled with a capital C. This reflects a 
certain concession to a longstanding ideal of unity among Muslims in 
the country. The evidence demonstrates a certain common experience 
of marginality but more substantially it shows that Muslims are deeply 
divided along lines of class, caste, and gender. More controversially, the 
report takes on the enduring problem of caste or biraderi among Mus-
lims and argues that there exists three general status and occupational 
categories of Muslims: the ashrafs (noble) who “are without social dis-
abilities”;3 the ajlafs who are equivalent to what in India is classified as 
“Other Backward Classes;“ and finally the arzals who occupy a position 
much like the untouchables, or Scheduled castes, in the Hindu social 
order. The last two categories are eligible for various affirmative action 
programmes and “reserved” jobs and political representation in India; 
but these have hitherto only been offered to Hindu communities. Point-
ing out that caste is a real factor among Muslims and that more than 
half of all Muslims in India belong to these sections may provoke anger 
among conservative Muslims. However, the proposal that these Mus-
lim subgroups should also be eligible for reservations and assistance 
from the government has already provoked a complex set of reactions 
in India. Predictably, Hindu nationalists find the proposal preposterous 
and “anti-national” and have denounced Rajender Sachar as “caring for 
terrorists.” Many leaders and spokespeople of lower caste Hindus and 
ex-untouchables, for whom these provisions are at the heart of their 
political consciousness and organization, have been somewhat wary 
about the prospect of sharing the benefits of affirmative action. The 
issue of reserving jobs and providing education for Muslims is thus 
bound to be controversial, and the debate over this already overshad-
ows the full range of compelling evidence and complex recommenda-
tions made in the Sachar report.
Marginal but proud
The Sachar report describes a diverse community which, though 
marginalized in multiple ways for decades, retains a strong sense of 
pride, and an unusual resilience. The cultural, economic, and politi-
cal introversion among Muslims is often described in public debates 
in India as the essential obstacle for all to overcome, as if these were 
innate characteristics of Muslims. This report has authoratively shown 
that present circumstances are the response of a proud community 
to decades of systematic exclusion from broader social networks in 
India. The question, of course, is whether the report’s many and well 
thought-out recommendations can be transformed into viable poli-
cies in the broad centrist coalition that governs India at the moment. 
A related question is whether any of these recommendations—e.g. to 
create mixed public spaces, mixed neighbourhoods, and mixed schools 
and education—can ever be implemented. Will such policies address 
the apprehensions and anger among young Muslim men with few job 
opportunities, who are routinely harassed by the police, and incarcer-
ated three times more often than anyone else in the country? Whatever 
happens, this report stands as a powerful “myth 
buster” that should significantly reduce the blame 
placed on Indian Muslims for the latter’s margin-
ality and poverty. 
Convention 
of displaced 
Indian Muslims, 
Ahmedabad, 
1 February 2007
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